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COLOR AS A TRADEMARK AND THE MERE COLOR RULE:
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT FOR COLOR ALONE'
CRAIG SUMMERFIELD
I. INTRODUCTION
Product color, or color alone, can be very important to a corpora-
tion, including potential exclusive rights to use that color.' Product
color refers to the general or background color covering merchandise or
packaging, such as the red of a red can.2 Some corporations try to de-
velop rights in a product color so that competitors may not use the same
product color on a similar product.3 These corporations seek trademark
rights through registration and protection of color alone as a source iden-
tifying mark.
Corporate interest in product color rights stems from the effect color
has on consumer perception and purchasing.4 Consumers are attracted
by certain colors and avoid other colors as unappealing, and consumers
often remember a product color, using the color in purchases.5 Because
of consumer recognition, such as "buy the red one," corporations want
to protect a colored good's reputation. Whether the reputation was de-
veloped intentionally by advertising or through consumer word of
mouth, a business may want exclusive use rights in the color alone of its
product. Some courts recognize the corporate interest in color rights,
but other courts refuse to grant trademark rights to color alone under the
"mere color rule."16
1. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Owens-Com-
ing spent over $42,000,000 in advertising its PINK insulation between 1972 and 1981. The rights to
the color pink were important enough to warrant expensive litigation. Some believe the investment
by Owens-Coming in pink was so great that the case has little value outside its facts. Nutrasweet
Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1640 (1991).
2. The term product color does not refer to a combination of colors creating a design, such as
a polka dotted red and white can. The use of colors to create a distinct design is not the type of color
alone this Note deals with. Color in design is examined only to explain difficulties associated with
the use of color in trademarks.
3. See eg., Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125; Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027.
4. DEAN B. JUDD & GUNTER WYSZECKI, COLOR IN BUSINESS, SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY 32
(3d ed. 1975).
5. Id. Pink on fiberglas is arguably more recognized than the name of the manufacturer,
Owens-Coming, which is also placed on the fiberglas.
6. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125 (recognizing a corporate interest in pink on fiberglas);
Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1945) (recog-
nizing a corporate interest in the use of yellow on taxi cabs); Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027 (court
acknowledges other circuits which protect the corporate interest in a product color by granting
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This Note will show that color alone should receive registration and
protection through infringement suits like any other trade dress. After
looking at the history of the mere color rule and the practical effect of
that history, Lanham Act policy and interpretation show that the mere
color rule should not be used as an absolute bar to rights in color alone.
The rationales for the mere color rule are analyzed. Of these rationales,
only color depletion provides a policy reason to deny rights in color alone
for some instances. This Note will show that the competitive need test
accounts for the proper application of the color depletion rationale, so
the mere color rule does not need to be applied as an absolute bar. An
approach which protects competition and accounts for color depletion
concerns while fulfilling the purposes of the Lanham Act under the com-
petitive need test will be found and applied to hypothetical circum-
stances. The mere color rule should not be applied as an absolute bar to
trademark rights in color alone.
II. HISTORY
Traditionally, courts have held that a color alone (or color per se)
cannot function as a trademark.7 This "mere color rule" absolute bar
was created when the Supreme Court expressed, in dicta, that "[w]hether
mere color can constitute a valid trade-mark may admit of doubt.""
However, the Court denied trademark rights based on the lack of distinc-
tiveness from the claim of "any" color applied as a streak to a rope, not
based on the mere color rule to deny rights to one particular color.9
As early as 1906, a court made use of the "mere color rule" to deny
protection of a color alone. 10 "Color depletion," based on unwanted re-
duction of the limited number of colors available for use by competitors,
exclusive use rights in color alone, but refuses to protect that type of interest); Campbell Soup Co. v.
Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795 (3rd Cir. 1949) (denying rights in the colors red and white on food
cans).
7. Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d 795 (no trademark rights in the colors of red and white on canned
food); Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1950) (color stripes on candy
packs cannot function as a trademark). But ef Yellow Cab, 147 F.2d 407 (use of yellow by a
competitor was enjoined under an unfair competition analysis without mention of the mere color
rule); Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Crawford-Austin Mfg. Co., 12 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (ignor-
ing a mere color rule argument without even citing mere color rule precedent, a company was given
trademark rights in reddish brown for use to distinguish tents).
8. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171 (1906).
9. Id. The court was concerned that a streak of any color, not a specific color, would not
provide notice to competitors about what they could and could not copy. This is an analysis under
the distinctive doctrine of trademarks. The trademark did not have secondary meaning to the con-
suming public (it did not represent to the public that the product was one particular brand). There-
fore, the Supreme Court did not actually make use of the mere color rule.
10. Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 203 U.S.
589 (1906) (blue and red tips on a match are not entitled to trademark status).
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was given as the rationale behind the rule in that early case1' and contin-
ues to be followed by the courts.' 2 Shade confusion, adequate protection
provided by color in design, and tradition are other reasons courts do not
allow protection of trademark rights in color alone. 13
In Owens-Coming, the Federal Circuit specifically rejected the mere
color rule as an absolute bar in color alone.14 The court allowed registra-
tion of a color alone. 15 According to the Federal Circuit, color alone can
be registered as a trademark if it is non-functional-including utility and
competitive need, shows secondary meaning, and does not apply to a spe-
cific Lanham Act registration bar.' 6 Thus, "[tihe Federal Circuit merely
declined to establish a per se prohibition against registering colors as
trademarks."1 7 The court did note that color alone marks, because of
their nature, carry a difficult burden in demonstrating distinctiveness.'
The Owens-Corning court established a "competitive need" test for
granting rights in color alone.' 9 An exception to the mere color rule
exists and registration will be granted when a particular color is not used
or needed for effective competition.20 Under the competitive need test,
the color depletion rationale was not faulted for use in appropriate cir-
cumstances but was no longer used as an absolute bar to rights in color
alone.21
The Ninth Circuit followed the lead of the Federal Circuit and ac-
knowledged that an exception to the mere color rule exists. 22 This court
applied the Owens-Corning competitive need test for registration of color
11. Id. at 729-30. ('qf, by appropriating two colors for each brand, it could monopolize them, it
would soon take all the colors not in use by the complainant, and thus cover the entire field at
once.").
12. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027.
13. Id. at 1027. The Nutrasweet Court relied on the dissent by Judge Bissell in Owens-Corning,
774 F.2d at 1128.
14. Owens.Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120. There was a strong dissent by Judge Bissell which ar-
gued for continued application of the mere color rule as an absolute bar to registration.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1121 (functionality); id. at 1124 (secondary meaning); id. at 1119 (specific Lanham
Act registration bars).
17. First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1987).
18. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1127. The dissent argued that the mere color rule was an
absolute bar, but even if it was not, the color pink did not have secondary meaning. This argument
over secondary meaning, or distinctiveness, shows the difficulty of creating a distinctive mark based
on color alone. The dispute existed even after Owens-Coming had spent over $42,000,000 in adver-
tising the color pink. Id. at 1125.
19. Id. at 1121.
20. Id. at 1122.
21. Id. at 1120.
22. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1382 (recognizing the validity of the Owens-Coming decision, but
denying rights in yellow containers for anti-freeze based on the Owens-Coming competitive need
test).
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alone in an infringement suit for protection of a color alone.23 The court
found a competitive need for yellow on anti-freeze containers.24 The
mere color rule no longer operated as an absolute bar for both the grant
of trademark rights through registration and the protection of trademark
rights through infringement actions.
Subsequently, in Nutrasweet v. Stadt, the Seventh Circuit expressly
held that color alone is not subject to trademark protection.25 The
court's use of the mere color rule in an infringement suit is contrary to
the Ninth Circuit's application of the competitive need test.26 Nutras-
weet sought rights in the use of the color blue on table top sugar substi-
tute packets of Equal.27 Stadt Corporation was going to market a table
top sugar substitute, Sweet One, in a different shade of blue.28 After
noting the unusual set of facts in Owens-Corning, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the reasoning of the Owens-Corning dissent was more per-
suasive.29 The court's acceptance of the Owens-Corning dissent ex-
presses a belief, opposite the Federal Circuit, that registration of color
alone should not be granted. 30 The Nutrasweet court gave Judge Bis-
sell's, the dissenting judge in Owens-Corning, four reasons for continued
application of the mere color rule: consistency and predictability, ade-
quate protection of color through protection of design, shade confusion,
and color depletion acting as a bar to competition.31 Furthermore, the
court pointed to its inability to predict the entry of future competitors as
a reason the competitive need approach would not work.32
The American Law Institute has adopted the traditional approach
23. Id.
24. Id. The court relied on a lower court finding that other competitors also used yellow con-
tainers. Id.
25. 917 F.2d at 1024.
26. Id. (court applied the mere color rule as an absolute bar to rights in a color alone). But cf
First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1382 (The competitive need test did not fault the color depletion rationale
of the mere color test for proper application, so the court found competitive need based on color
depletion. The Ninth Circuit did accept that the mere color rule no longer existed as an absolute bar
for infringement suits.).
27. 917 F.2d at 1025.
28. Id. at 1026. Nutrasweet's Equal is packaged in a greenish-blue packet and Stadt's Sweet
One is in a reddish-blue packet.
29. Id. at 1027.
30. Id. This belief is contrary to the Owens-Coming decision and is the basis of the "split"
between the circuits for registration of color alone trademarks. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at
1120. A true split cannot occur due to the appeals procedure of registration questions under the
Lanham Act. All registration appeals are to the Federal Circuit. Lanham Act § 21, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071 (a)(l) (1988). All infringement or protection appeals are to the regional Appeals Courts.
Lanham Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988). This aspect of the circuit split is discussed infra at note
36 and accompanying text.
31. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027-1028.
32. Id. at 1028.
[VCol. 68:973
COLOR AS A TRADEMARK
of applying the mere color rule as an absolute bar.33 The proposed Re-
statement of Unfair Competition acknowledges the distinctiveness of
color in combination with design, but follows the mere color rule based
on the color depletion theory for color alone.34 Owens-Corning is cited in
the Reporter's Note but is limited to its specific facts.35
There is now a split in the Federal Appellate Courts over the appli-
cation of the mere color rule in infringement suits and a difference of
beliefs over application of the mere color rule for registration. 36 Judge
Bissell's concern for comity amongst the circuits and reliance on tradi-
tion in the law is now more of a problem than when expressed.37 The
issue must be resolved by the court which originally hinted at the mere
color rule, the Supreme Court, or rights in color alone will continue to be
unstable.
Many issues are unanswered because of the present confused state of
the law in color alone rights. Proper application, if any, of the competi-
tive need test or any other test appropriate for color alone has not been
established. Under the Lanham Act,38 trademark registration versus in-
fringement has not been examined by the courts applying Owens-Corn-
ing. The practical effects of the split between the circuits must also be
studied.
III. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE SPLIT
Differences in application of the mere color rule between two re-
gional circuits create concerns about protection through infringement of
trademark rights in a color alone. With the split between the Ninth and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, 39 trademark rights in color alone for
infringement decisions remain uncertain. One circuit protects color
alone rights, while another does not. This split will undoubtedly lead to
33. RESTATEMENT THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrMON ch. 3, § 13 cmt. d (Proposed Draft No.
2, 1990).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Sandra Edelman, Restatement of the Law of Trademarks" A Review, 81 TRADE-
MARK REP. 554, 563 (1991).
36. The Ninth Circuit followed the Federal Circuit by not applying the mere color rule as an
absolute bar, but applying the color depletion theory when applicable (competitive need). First
Brands, 809 F.2d 1378 and Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d 1116. The Seventh Circuit chose to apply the
mere color rule as an absolute bar to trademark rights in color alone--competitive need always exists
no matter what the facts. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d 1024. This is the split for infringement. Supra, note
26. Under registration, there cannot be a true split, but the courts may disagree with actions of the
Federal Circuit. Supra note 30.
37. Owens.Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). This is the statute which governs trademark law.
39. First Brands, 809 F.2d 1378; Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d 1024.
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forum shopping due to the major difference in substantive rights.40
One of Judge Bissell's and the Seventh Circuit's reasons for denying
protection of color alone should be addressed at this point. "Consistency
and predictability" of the law was given as a reason for continuing appli-
cation of the mere color rule.41 Judge Bissell pointed out that comity
between the circuits dictates that "breaking away from the lines of deci-
sions in the regional circuits will have a divisive effect on the trademark
law."'42 This argument now has little impact on the proper application of
the mere color rule. A division between the circuits occurred first with
the Federal Circuit and was followed by the Ninth Circuit.43 Therefore,
there is no line of cases to break away from, and the national trademark
law is not consistent.44 Thus, comity no longer supports the application
of the mere color rule as an absolute bar.
A difference in application between registration and infringement
actions affects substantive rights in color alone trademarks, making color
alone trademark rights potentially worthless. Registration of a trade-
mark is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark.45
This prima facie evidence of secondary meaning is rebuttable.46 While a
trademark may receive registration, trademark rights may still be de-
nied.47 Appeal to the courts on registration issues is to the Federal Cir-
cuit.4 8 Infringement actions are appealed to the regional Appeals Courts
and not the Federal Circuit.49 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit is bound
to follow the trademark law of the regional Appeals Courts on questions
of infringement.50 Therefore, while Owens-Coming may have a regis-
tered mark in a color alone from the Federal Circuit decision, a regional
circuit, such as the Seventh Circuit, will not allow protection of those
rights. 51
40. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128.
41. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027.
42. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting). One form of comity when applied
to trademark rights is the regionally shared responsibility for the trademark laws between the circuit
courts.
43. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d 1116; First Brands, 809 F.2d 1378.
44. This argument is also one which would dictate that the Old English Common Law should
still exist. Therefore, it provides little insight into the mere color rule and whether it should be
applied.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1988).
46. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985).
47. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1119 ("In any action involving a registered mark the court may
determine the right to registration, order cancellation of the registrations .
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988).
50. Id.
51. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128; Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027. This is a grave concern
because the registration of color alone could be meaningless in the Seventh Circuit.
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The mere color rule's application in registration is not different from
the rule's application in infringement actions. The mere color rule has
been applied to both registration and infringement. Judge Bissell felt
that the mere color rule had been applied to registration.52 The Nutras-
weet court pointed to a history of past application of the mere color rule
to infringement decisions.53 Courts have not distinguished between re-
gistration and infringement for application of the mere color rule. Regis-
tration without protection or not allowing registration leads to the same
result, no trademark rights in color alone.
The rationale behind the mere color rule applies to both registration
and infringement analysis. Some requirements of registration are differ-
ent than the requirements of infringement and will be addressed later.
Tradition and consistency in the law apply to registration and in-
fringement. Since the mere color rule was applied consistently in both
registration and infringement actions, the tradition exists in both.54 The
tradition rationale applies to both the grant and the protection of trade-
mark rights.
Color in design as an alternative to color alone applies to registra-
tion and infringement. Color in design is granted registration.55 Color in
design is also protected in infringement actions.56 The color in design as
an alternative to color alone rationale applies to the grant and protection
of rights in color alone.
Shade confusion applies to registration and infringement. Shade
confusion is a concern created by the likelihood to confuse test of trade-
marks.57 The likelihood to confuse test is applied in registration analy-
sis58 and infringement analysis.59 The shade confusion rationale applies
to the grant and protection of rights in color alone.
Color depletion applies to registration and infringement. Color de-
pletion exists whenever a color's use is denied to a competitor or poten-
tial competitor. 60 If registration is granted in a color alone, it is unlikely
that competitors would want to risk the potential for trademark infringe-
ment. Registration of color depletes the number of available colors. If a
color alone is protected in an infringement action, competitors would not
52. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1128 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
53. 917 F.2d at 1027.
54. See supra notes 52, 53 and accompanying text.
55. In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
56. Quabuag Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161 (1st Cir. 1977).
57. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1123.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
59. Id § 1125(a)(1) (1988).
60. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027.
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risk a similar infringement action by using the same color. Infringement
of a color alone would act to deplete the number of available colors. The
color depletion rationale of the mere color rule applies in both the grant
and protection of color alone.
The rationale behind the mere color rule applies to both registration
and infringement. Courts apply the mere color rule to both registration
and infringement. Therefore, the mere color rule can be examined on its
own, regardless of whether the dispute is over registration or
infringement.
There is a spit between the circuits over the application of the mere
color rule as an absolute bar. The circuit split creates practical problems
like forum shopping and uncertain rights. These problems should be
solved by determining the proper application, if any, of the mere color
rule to trademarks in color alone.
IV. THE LANHAM ACT AS A GUIDE TO COLOR ALONE
Varying interpretations of the Lanham Act have led to the split be-
tween the circuits.61 The Federal Circuit claims the Lanham Act's cre-
ators sought to create a liberal law void of unspecified rules such as the
mere color rule.62 Judge Bissell claims that the authors of the Lanham
Act did not seek to void the mere color rule, as evidenced by the lack of
stated congressional intent and court decisions following the creation of
the Lanham Act which made use of the mere color rule as an absolute
bar to rights in color alone.63 The American Law Institute and the Sev-
enth Circuit agree with Judge Bissell and would apply the mere color
rule as an absolute bar.64
The relevant portions of the Lanham Act impacting color alone in
trademarks are section 2, covering the requirements for registration of
federal trademarks, 65 and sections 32 and 43, covering false designation
of origin or infringement. 66 The Lanham Act defines a trademark to in-
clude "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof
... to identify and distinguish his or her goods.., from those manufac-
61. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1120 (the Lanham Act allows the registration of color alone as
a federal trademark), and Nutrasweez, 917 F.2d at 1027 (the Lanham Act adequately protects the use
of color, so there is no need to allow color alone as a basis for trademark rights).
62. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120.
63. Id. at 1128 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
64. Supra notes 33-35; Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027 (the Seventh Circuit found "Judge Bissel's
reasoning persuasive," but did not cite the dissenting Judge's Lanham Act analysis).
65. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1114 (1988).
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tured or sold by others .... ,,67
A. Policy Dictating the Interpretation of the Lanham Act
The purposes and policies of the Lanham Act dictate an interpreta-
tion of the Act allowing registration and protection of color alone trade-
marks with certain restrictions. The Lanham Act was meant to make
trademark registration more liberal, to dispense with mere technical
prohibitions, and to modernize the trademark statutes to conform to le-
gitimate present-day business practices. 6 The Lanham Act's intent is to
protect businesses against unfair competition and to prevent consumer
deception. 69 As a further clarification of intent, the legislative history
states two purposes underlying the trademark statute.70 The Lanham
Act provides national protection of trademarks so that the owner may
secure the goodwill of his business and protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers and products.71 For color alone,
the policy of protecting the consumer will not influence the application of
the mere color rule in any way, but the policy of protecting investment in
a mark dictates that the mere color rule should not be an absolute bar.
1. Protecting the Consuming Public
Trademarks are meant to protect the consuming public from decep-
tion. The consumer may want to purchase a product from a certain
source since that source has provided what the purchaser seeks in the
product in the past.72 For the consumer, trademarks are meant to make
informed consumer purchases possible and to encourage the maintenance
of product quality for the consumer.73
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1992).
68. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1276.
69. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1992). The Lanham Act is also meant to "regulate com-
merce within the control of Congress... ; protect registered marks ... from interference by State, or
territorial legislation; ... and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions
.... " Id. However, the purposes listed in this footnote are procedural and will not impact the
analysis of the mere color rule.
70. S. REp. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
71. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (not a mere color
rule case, but discusses general trademark policy).
72. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274. But
Cf. JEROME GILsoN, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[8] (1991) ("Many courts do
not perceive protection of the public as an independent basis for relief, but merely a result of the
application of the 'likelihood of confusion' test" (footnote omitted)).
73. S. REP. No. 1333,79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274. The
production of quality goods aids in competition by securing rewards for investment by manufactur-
ers through the reputation quality creates in a mark. SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labora-
tories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1067 (3d Cir. 1980). Consumer knowledge of a trademark encourages
1993]
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The goal of consumer protection does not affect the mere color rule
since other markings besides color alone may be used to protect the con-
sumer. Consumers are protected if rights in color alone are or are not
granted. Only during transition from one consumer association to an-
other will quality and search costs be affected. 74 The policy of protecting
the consumer will not affect the granting or protection of rights in color
alone.
2. Protecting the Owner's Investment
If a manufacturer has invested in a color alone mark, creating good
will for the color alone product, the investment should be protected as
long as it does not harm competition. Trademark rights protect the in-
vestment of producers in their mark's goodwill from competitors who
may attempt to appropriate the goodwill for themselves.75 Manufactur-
ers advertise and develop reputations of quality in their marks as a means
to promote consumer purchases. 76 Trademark rights must then be pro-
tected through registration and infringement actions to keep competitors
from using a mark's reputation without paying for the promotional ex-
penses the owner incurred.77 A primary goal of establishing trademark
rights is to protect the owner of a trademark.7
Trademarks are meant to foster competition by protection of invest-
ment.7 9 Conversely, a trademark cannot be used to inhibit competitors
from selling similar goods.8 0 While promoting competition through in-
manufacturers to create as high a quality as the consumer is willing to pay for. J. THOMAS McCAR-
THY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting the Craswell Report, 7
(1979)) .(FTC Policy Planning Issues Paper: Trademarks, Consumer Information and Barriers to
Competition, FTC Office of Policy Planning). Without marks, manufacturers could not be held
accountable for the quality of their products, which would lead to cost-cutting through lowering of
quality. Id.
Marks provide consumers with the ability to make informed purchases without high search
costs. Id. Past purchases connect a certain good and its performance with a certain maker, provid-
ing the consumer with knowledge for future purchases. Id.
74. This may be the source of the Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027, argument that color trademark
rights are adequately protected by color in combination with a design. The creation and protection
of rights in color alone is not needed to protect the consumer.
75. Union Nat'l Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843-844 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, an
action for trademark infringement is tested by a competitive mark's likelihood to cause confusion.
Id. See also S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274
("[Mwhere the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public
the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.")
(footnote omitted).
76. MCCARTHY, supra note 73, at § 2:10.
77. Id.
78. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 758 (1943).
79. Park "N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198.
80. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (trademarks are not al-
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vestment protection, a trademark cannot interfere with competition and
is not considered a monopoly in a product but only the exclusive right to
use a mark on a good or service.81 The establishment of trademark pro-
tection is limited to mere product markings (source identification) and
cannot be used to interfere with competition in a product.
These goals and limitations of trademark rights affect the registra-
tion and infringement actions of color alone. The goal of protecting an
owner's investment weighs in favor of allowing registration of color alone
and protecting the color mark from misappropriation by competitors
when a manufacturer has made an investment in the color alone.82 The
limitation of not inhibiting competition affects the situations in which
rights in color may be protected, thus showing the proper application of
the mere color rule.83 The Lanham Act's liberal intent of allowing broad
protection without technical prohibitions84 dictates allowing registration
and protection of trademark rights in color alone when the rights will not
harm competition or violate prohibitions in the Lanham Act.
B. Registration Under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act dictates allowing registration of color alone trade-
marks as long as secondary meaning is shown and a specific registration
bar does not apply. The Lanham Act states that "[n]o trademark by
which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of
others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of
its nature unless it" falls under one of several limitations.85 The Supreme
Court begins statutory construction with the "assumption that the ordi-
nary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative pur-
pose."'8 6 Given this starting analysis and the Lanham Act's purpose of
allowing liberal protection of trademarks without mere technical prohibi-
tions, 7 the registration of color alone marks will be examined.
Secondary meaning must be shown for a color to be registered as a
lowed to interfere in the area of patent law, so copying of a product but not it's trademark is
allowed).
81. McCARTHY, supra note 73, §§ 2:10, 2:5 (by protecting investment, the trademark laws
encourage further investment in advertising and goodwill). No monopoly is involved in trademark
protection. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1275.
82. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1127 (this case deals with the registration, not the protection,
of trademark rights in color alone).
83. Id. at 1120.
84. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1276. See also In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1360 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (not a
color case).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
86. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1992).
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trademark18 Secondary meaning is acquired when consumers associate
the mark with a particular source of manufacture, showing that the mark
is distinctive of that source's product.8 9 If consumers associate a particu-
larly colored product with a certain manufacturer, the color will have
secondary meaning. Consumers refer to many products by their color
only, like "get the red one," which shows color acting as an indicator of a
product brand.90 Red would be distinctive of a brand. A color alone
which has secondary meaning should be allowed registration.
Other trademarks allowed registration show a broad policy of al-
lowing many things with secondary meaning to be registered. The mere
shape of a package may be distinctive.91 The Owens-Corning court ob-
served that if a mark is capable of distinguishing an applicant's goods,
then it is capable of serving as a trademark.92 The court noted many
examples where registration was granted for non-word marks which
would dictate granting registration for color alone,93 including contain-
ers, 94 tabs having a particular location on a garment,95 and sounds.96
The broad range of trademarks granted registration shows the needless-
ness of denying registration in a color alone with secondary meaning.
The Lanham Act even provides that nothing shall prevent registra-
tion of goods which have developed secondary meaning except four stat-
utory bars.97 Therefore, assuming a color has secondary meaning, if
none of the four bars applies, color alone should be registerable under the
plain meaning of the statute.
The first bar applies to any mark which "comprises immoral, decep-
tive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may ... falsely suggest a
connection with persons..., institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or
bring them into contempt, or disrepute.198 The color pink, or any other
88. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124. Color registration is examined under the statutory
guidelines provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988). Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124. The mere
color rule is concerned with whether an application for registration of a color should even be ex-
amined, not whether the color has developed secondary meaning. This Note is concerned with the
absolute bar of color marks, not the difficulties of creating a color to source association in
consumers.
89. Id.
90. JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 4, at 32.
91. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (particular shape of a wine
bottle allowed registration).
92. 774 F.2d at 1120.
93. Id. at 1119-20.
94. Exparte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks 1958).
95. In re Levi Strauss & Co., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 348 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
96. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120 (citing U.S. Trademark Registration No. 916,522 issued
to the National Broadcasting Co., Inc. for the notes GEC on chimes).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1988).
98. Id. § 1052(a).
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color alone, is hardly scandalous. A few color combinations which are
not arbitrary enough to be considered a design may be denied registra-
tion as a reflection of a national symbol. The flag of Poland has two
horizontal stripes, one of red and one of white, so this color combination
may imply a Polish product and would not be registerable.9 9 Other col-
ors functioning as marks in non-arbitrary combinations or alone will not
suggest connections with a nation. Color alone is not scandalous. The
first bar does not act to deny registration of a color alone.
Secondly, registration is barred if a mark "comprises the flag.., of
the United States, . . . of any State or municipality, or of any foreign
nation . . . -"o0 The same flag concern discussed earlier applies, but
there are many colors not used in flags or with the same pattern as a flag.
Therefore, registration of color alone would rarely be denied on this
basis.
Thirdly, registration is barred if a mark "comprises a name, portrait,
or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his writ-
ten consent .... ,,101 Obviously, a color alone, which is not a design, will
not be barred by this section.
Fourthly, registration is barred if a mark "comprises a mark...
likely.., to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.... 102
After the registration of pink on home fiberglas insulation, 10 3 the use of a
confusingly similar color, or shade of pink, would not be registerable.
This is a factually based analysis which leads to the shade confusion ra-
tionale of the mere color rule.10 4 The same likelihood of confusion test is
used for infringement. The likelihood to confuse bar to registration will
be discussed under the later analysis of shade confusion.
Given the plain meaning of the statute, three of the four bars to
registration should not prevent registration of color alone. The fourth,
likelihood of confusion, will later be shown not to prevent registration.
With the purpose of liberalization of trademark registration and plain
meaning in interpreting the Lanham Act, a color alone mark with secon-
dary meaning should receive registration since none of the bars
applies. 10 5
99. But see Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d 795 (no discussion of the Polish flag possibility while
denying rights to red and white horizontal stripes on a can).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (1988).
101. Id. § 1052(c).
102. Id. § 1052(d).
103. Owens.Coming, 774 F.2d 1116.
104. This Note deals extensively with shade confusion under the mere color rule analysis infra at
notes 160-91 and accompanying text.
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
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C. Infringement Under the Lanham Act
Standard trade dress analysis should be applied, allowing protection
of trademark rights in color alone. The test for infringement is non-func-
tionality, secondary meaning to establish a trademark, and likelihood of
confusion to show infringement by the accused. 10 6 Secondary meaning
and likelihood of confusion are the same for infringement and registra-
tion.10 7 Functionality is meant to protect competition, 10  a purpose of
the Lanham Act. 10 9 A color alone with secondary meaning which is
non-functional and not likely to cause confusion should be protected
through infringement suits like any other trademark.
Trade dress, a trademark based on the appearance of a product or
service, has been granted protection showing the breadth of trade-
marks.' 10 The atmosphere of a restaurant would be allowed protection if
secondary meaning, non-functionality and a likelihood of confusion are
shown.1 ' The court acknowledged the possibility of this protection
since the atmosphere of the restaurant could create consumer associa-
tions with that particular restaurant and the Lanham Act was meant to
protect a broad range of trademarks.11 2 Broad protection of a trademark
which has developed consumer association with the product or service
dictates protecting a color alone trademark if the color is non-functional.
Functionality is often used as a basis for the mere color rule.'1 3 All
marks must not be functional, whether they involve color or not.1 14 To
register a trademark, the trademark must not be functional. 11s The func-
tionality requirement of registration and infringement is independent of
the mere color rule. A color with functional features will be denied pro-
tection or registration because it is functional, not because it is a mere
color.
The functionality doctrine exists to avoid competitive advantage and
preemption of the federal patent laws.' 16 Thus, "[a] product feature or
106. Truck Equip. Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217-21 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). This is an analysis under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
107. GiLsoN, supra note 72, at § 3.05[3].
108. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
109. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
110. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987) (trademark
rights possible for a restaurant's overall atmosphere).
111. Id. at 841.
112. Id. at 843.
113. Thomas A. Schmidt, Creating Protectable Color Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 285,
287 (1989).
114. Vision Sports Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120-24 (examining functionality to determine the register-
ability of the color pink).
116. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231 (trademark law cannot preempt the patent law,
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package design is functional if it is essential to the product's use or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article.' 117
Color operates functionally if it is necessary to a product's use, such
as the natural color of the product.' 1 8 By allowing trademark appropri-
ation of the natural color of carbonated cola beverages, competitors
would be placed at a competitive disadvantage.'" 9 The competitors
would be forced to color their products to compete, increasing a competi-
tor's product cost in comparison to the product costs for the owner of the
natural color trademark. 120 Increasing competition costs is contrary to
the trademark policy against inhibiting competition.' 2' Color may also
be functional due to other financial concerns increasing the costs of com-
petition with an owner of trademark rights to a particular color. 22
Aesthetic fumctionality also limits the use of colors for trademark
rights. 123 Based on a determination that farmers like their machinery to
match, a court found green to be functional.'24 The court found that
protection of the color "John Deere Green" would hinder competition
since farmers would want a green product, not because of the manufac-
turer, but because of the color itself.125 Thus, "John Deere Green" is
functional since it may hinder competition. 26 Likewise, pink in upset
stomach remedies functioned to soothe the mind, helping the solution
cure patients.' 27 The court noted that "a rejected stomach medicine
scarcely has a fair opportunity to fulfill its function."' 128 Competition
cannot suffer due to trademarks. Therefore, aesthetic functionality de-
so exclusive use trademark rights cannot be given in an object'subject to possible patent laws such as
a functional object). See also Inwood Lab. Inc. v. Ives Lab. Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) ("Repro-
duction of a functional attribute is legitimate competitive activity.").
117. Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 614. The Owens-Coming test of competitive need is based on the
policy behind functionality of not increasing the cost of competition. Competitive need is analyzed
as part of determining whether a mark is functional.
118. Id. at 614. See also North Shore Lab. Corp. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 523 (5th Cir. 1983).
119. Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Lab., Inc., 155 F.2d 59, 66 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 329 U.S. 773
(1946).
120. Lee Burgunder, Trademark Registration of Product Colors: Issues and Answers, 26 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 581 n.24 (1986).
121. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. See also Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Univis, Inc.,
132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 213, 214 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (colored lenses functional since that specific colora-
tion operated to reduce reflection and refraction).
123. See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. de-
nied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd,
721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
124. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 98.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Norwich Pharmacal, 271 F.2d at 572.
128. Id. An upset stomach medication of another color might not be mentally pleasing, thus the
medication would be rejected by the consumer.
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mands that the use of a color which a consumer would specifically seek
for reasons other than to distinguish source cannot be used as a
trademark.1 29
Generic concerns with the use of color alone are often and easily
confused with functionality.1 30 Generic marks are also denied registra-
tion or protection and affect rights in color alone.1 31 As a practical aid to
determine color alone marks which may be registrable and protected,
and to observe how the number of available colors for competition may
be further limited, generic color concerns are examined.
Trademarks operate to distinguish goods for the consumer, which
maintains quality in the goods, promotes competition, and reduces con-
sumer search costs.1 32 Thus, when a trademark serves to indicate a prod-
uct class, instead of the particular product in the class, the mark affects
competition and is generic.1 33 The designation conveys product class,
which other competitors may not be able to convey at as cheap a price
without use of the designation.1 34
Concerns of genericide were incorrectly presented under the color
depletion rationale of the mere color rule by the dissent in Owens-Corn-
ing.1 35 The dissent points out that pink insulation has become synony-
mous with home insulation and that entrants into the insulation market
will need the color pink to compete.136 By barring entrants from compe-
tition, the registration of pink will hurt competition, which is contrary to
trademark policy.' 37 Therefore, the dissent concluded the color deple-
tion theory should apply.' 38 While a color may become generic, almost
requiring competitors to use that color to make sales, these generic colors
are best handled under the genericide doctrine, not the color depletion
doctrine. 139
129. See Brian R. Henry, Right Hat, Wrong Peg: In Re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation
and the Demise of the Mere Color Rule, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 389, 404 (1986). The author, seem-
ingly based on negative commentary towards aesthetic functionality, notes that the psychological
base of colors is not true function. Id. At the least, objective evidence of the psychological basis of a
colors function should be shown. Id.
130. Burgunder, supra note 120, at 606.
131. Id. at 595-604.
132. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
133. Burgunder, supra note 120, at 594.
134. Id.
135. 774 F.2d at 1129-32.
136. Id.
137. Id. The dissent notes that Owens-Coming is still protected if someone intentionally
"palms-off" pink fiberglass as Owens-Coming fiberglass.
138. Id.
139. Color depletion is concerned with any limiting of the available number of colors. Generic
colors limit the number of available colors. As will be shown later, there may be enough colors or
market reasons which allow some depletion of color. Therefore, if a color is generic, no registration
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Generic colors have impacted application of the mere color rule. In
Lifesavers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co.,"40 the court noted that color stripes
on candy packages functioned to indicate the flavor of candies in the
package.141 The descriptiveness of the colors operated to indicate the
flavor.142 The descriptive nature of color developed due to the generic
nature of the color. 43 Yellow on food products is known to represent
the class of products having a lemon flavor. Yellow generically repre-
sents a class of products, and the use of yellow on candy can not obtain
trademark rights since it is generic. 144 Orange on waste product bags is
generic.145 The government had adopted the use of orange on waste
products to designate the product as bio-hazardous. 146 The relevant in-
dustries associated the color orange as a designation of the class of bio-
hazardous goods.'14 7 Competition would be limited if rights were granted
in the widely used general public designation of orange for bio-hazardous
waste, since the same information could not easily be conveyed without
using the public designation.1 48 Some colors may have general-"ge-
neric"-meaning which will result in the denial of trademark rights in that
color.
If a color is not functional or generic and distinguishes a product,
the policy of protecting manufacturers' investment dictates that color
alone trademarks should be protected like any other trade dress. The
likelihood to confuse test does not act as an absolute bar, as will be
shown under the shade confusion discussion. The protection of color
alone marks should occur unless a specific countervailing policy, such as
a harm to competition, will occur.
or protection should be given, but if a color is not generic, generic colors should be taken into
account when calculating the total number of available colors for use by competitors under the color
depletion rationale of the mere color rule.
140. 182 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1950).
141. Id. at 7.
142. Id.
143. Burgunder, supra note 120, at 595 (discussing the generic use of green to represent mint).
144. Life Savers, 182 F.2d at 7, 9. The court determined that no trademark rights existed for the
same reason and with the same analysis under the rubric of a functionality doctrine. Id. The only
reason the color stripes had a functional effect is due to the generic class description provided by the
widely known meaning of the flavor colors involved.
145. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., No. 84-C8634, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11000, at 12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1988). This court also analyzed the case under the rubric of
functionality. The function was based on the generic designation of the color orange.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 6.
148. Extra printing on a bag would be needed to designate it as bio-hazardous, which still will
not communicate as effectively as an orange color the bio-hazardous nature of the bag. This generic
designation is functional based on its generic meaning to the public.
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V. ANALYSIS OF COLOR ALONE IN TRADEMARKS
A. Mere Color Rule as an Absolute Bar Rationale
Only the color depletion rationale of the mere color rule provides a
possible harm to competition and a reason for not granting and protect-
ing rights in color alone trademarks. 149 There are four reasons given for
the mere color rule to always apply. 150 Consistency and predictability in
the law was dealt with earlier and no longer has any weight for applica-
tion of the mere color rule as an absolute bar.151 The three remaining
reasons for continued application of the mere color rule in all cases are:
adequate protection to colors is given through protection of design, shade
confusion in determining likelihood of confusion of colors, 52 and color
depletion. 1 53
1. Adequate Protection Through Other Means
Adequate protection of color trademarks through other means does
not explain the present application of the trademark laws and is not a
reason to deny granting and protecting rights in a color alone. The Nu-
trasweet court and the Owens-Corning dissent believe colors are ade-
quately protected for trademarks.' 54 Through the use of color in
combination with design, color can perform a trademark function.' 55
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that color was protected in this way and
need not be protected as color alone. 56
This logic ignores one of the purposes of the trademark laws and
does not explain the modem practice of granting trademark rights in
trade dress. The Lanham Act was created to liberalize the law of trade-
marks in recognition of present day business practices. 57 Under this
purpose, registration has been granted for containers, product configura-
tions, packaging, slogans, sounds, and goods taking the form of the mark
itself.'58 All of these trademark grants could have been adequately pro-
tected by requiring a word mark to be placed on the goods. However,
149. See Anthony V. Lupo, The Pink Panther Sings the Bluer Is Color Capable of Trademark
Protection?, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 637 (1991) (reaching the conclusion that the color depletion
rationale should not exist at all).
150. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027-28.
151. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
152. Both registration and infringement use the likelihood to confuse test.
153. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1028.
154. Ia at 1027; Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129-30 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
155. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1130.
156. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027.
157. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1276.
158. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119, 1120 (and cases cited).
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due to their nature as distinguishing the product or source, trademark
rights were given in these product markings.15 9 Therefore, Congress and
the courts have determined that, even though other means are available
to distinguish a product, a marking which distinguishes a product should
be entitled to trademark rights to protect manufacturer investment. Ad-
equate protection through other markings is not a reason for denying
trademark rights in color alone.
2. Shade Confusion
Shade confusion does not occur any more for color than confusion
would occur for a word trademark, so this rationale of the mere color
rule should not be used to deny granting and protecting color alone
rights. The shade confusion rationale is based on the belief that infringe-
ment and registration would end up being a question of shade confusion
due to the likelihood of confusion test.l60 The test is the same for both
infringement and registrability.161 The likelihood of confusion test calls
for a comparison between two marks to determine if the ordinary con-
sumer would confuse one mark for the other.162 If an accused mark is
likely to be confusingly similar with another mark, registration will be
denied, 63 or infringement has occurred.'" The Nutrasweet court noted
that the only way to tell how different colors must be to avoid confusion
is through litigation. 165 Shade confusion is considered a problem because
of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining how different a shade
must be to not cause confusion. 66
The Owens-Corning court, agreeing with the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board, asserted that the likelihood of confusion among color
shades is no more difficult than deciding likelihood of confusion for word
marks. 167
Not only are there few problems with determining which shades
would be likely to confuse, the logic of shade confusion would dictate
that color never be used in a trademark. Colors are used in conjunction
159. Owens.Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120.
160. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027.
161. GitsoN, supra note 72, at § 3.05[3].
162. Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 613.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
164. Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 613.
165. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1028. The Seventh Circuit also noted that the trademark registra.
tion forms are in black and white. Id. at 1026. Since color can be part of a trademark in a design,
this logic should either not allow color in design, or the form concern is not a valid or weighty
concern.
166. Id. at 1027. The comparison is made between two colors.
167. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123.
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with design, and questions of shade confusion have been adequately an-
swered.1 68 Therefore, shade confusion would also call for denying trade-
mark rights when color is an element of a design, which is not presently
followed law. 169
The likelihood of confusion test and evidentiary proofs for the test
do not present any difficulty associated with the use of color alone. Like-
lihood of confusion for competing goods is determined by examining
seven factors,170 the determination of which is not affected because a
mark is for color alone instead of a word or color in a design mark. The
seven factors are: the degree of similarity of the marks, 17 1 the strength of
the owner's mark, 172 the quality of defendant's product, 17 3 the proximity
of the products, 174 the intent of the defendant, 17 5 the sophistication of the
buyers 76 and evidence of actual confusion. 177 While the consuming pub-
lic's memory of color may be less perfect than its memory of a word
mark, this merely affects the likelihood of confusion and not the ability to
determine likelihood of confusion.' 78 Therefore, shade confusion in
color alone is not more difficult than in other marks, particularly those
involving color plus another element, to determine. 179
An examination of infringement and registrability problems, which
occur due to the use of color in combination with a shape or other color,
shows the invalidity of shade confusion determination concerns. Issues
of color shade distinctions occur when a design with color is given trade-
168. Quabuag Rubber Co. v. Fabians Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161 (1st Cir. 1977).
169. In re Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526, 527 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
170. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cerl denied, 368 U.S.
820 (1961). See also American Home Products Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1087
(D.N.J. 1987) (infringement test applied for colors).
171. Just as colors in a design can be compared, color alone colors can be compared.
172. The strength of a mark is determined by the public's knowledge of the mark, not its
characteristics.
173. Color is applied from the most expensive to the cheapest products, and from the most
important goods purchased to the least important. Thus, a likelihood to confuse two products which
are expensive, warranting a closer look by the consumer, is the same for color alone as for word or
color in a design.
174. This factor is factual and is determined based on physical evidence. A color mark could be
used in close proximity or singly from another color mark.
175. The intent of the defendant does not rest on a physical characteristic of the product.
176. The sophistication of the buyers is also a factual determination and a mark that is a color
alone will not result in any different outcome from any other mark.
177. Actual confusion occurs for word marks and possibly will not occur between the color
alone trademarks like red or blue. The actual confusion test depends on the consumer and is not
increased or decreased due to the fact that one mark is color alone and another is a word or color in
a design.
178. Survey evidence may still be used. "By their nature color marks carry a difficult burden in
demonstrating distinctiveness and trademark character." Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1127. Affect-
ing the likelihood of confusion causes a broader range of depletion, so this is a color depletion
concern.
179. Owens.Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120.
[V€ol. 68:973
COLOR AS A TRADEMARK
mark rights, and color may even be the sole reason for finding or denying
infringement. 180
Color used in conjunction with shape is a design capable of trade-
mark status. 81 Yellow on an octagon shape obtained secondary mean-
ing for a brand of shoes and was granted trademark rights in an
infringement action.' 82 Red on a square, which obtained secondary
meaning for windows and ventilators for automobile trailers, was given
trademark rights by allowing registration.1 83
Color in combination with other colors is a design capable of trade-
mark status. 3 4 Two red bands with polka dots separated by a white
band, all of which covered a can of cleaner, were granted trademark
rights through federal registration. 8 5 The addition of polka dots to a
dual background color pattern is an arbitrary or distinctive design and
signifies source to consumers. 8 6
Some specific instances of courts' and trademark examiners' at-
tempts to deal with color in design show few problems associated with
color marks. Based on the fact that orange and gold are both combina-
tions of red and yellow, and that the commercial product of the orange
color varies to the point of being almost indistinguishable from gold, or-
180. In re Hodes-Lange Corp., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255 (r.T.A.B. 1970); Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Tallman Conduit Co., 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656 (T.T.A.B. 1966).
18 1. Quabaug Rubber, 567 F.2d at 161. See also American Home Products, 656 F. Supp. at 1058
(pharmaceutical case where the color of a pill did not infringe on a similar color of a pill because of
the different shape and texture of the pill).
182. The use by the plaintiff of a trademarked word on the yellow octagon did not affect the
trademark rights in just the yellow octagon. This was due to the secondary meaning established
through registration in just the yellow octagon. Quabaug Rubber, 567 F.2d at 161.
183. Hehr, 279 F.2d at 527-28. The manufacturers investment in advertising and the goods was
protected since the public recognized the goods as distinct. Id.
184. Swift, 223 F.2d at 953; Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824, 826 (C.C.P.A.
1975).
185. Swift, 223 F.2d at 953 (the use of colors in this design had obtained secondary meaning).
186. Id. The Campbell Soup decision was decided on the mere color rule, including the color
depletion theory. Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d at 798. The court recognized that "color... combined
with other things in a distinctive design" is capable of trademark rights. Id. at 799. The Campbell
Soup court decided that the red and white bands covering the whole product were not distinct or
arbitrary enough to be a design: "The mere division of a label into two background colors ... is not
. . . distinct or arbitrary .... Id. This seems to imply a court judgment on whether a color
combination is a design or mere background ornamentation (secondary meaning decision) and that
applying the mere color rule was just lip service once no secondary meaning was established. See
Plastilite, 508 F.2d at 826 (separation of a fishing bobber into two colors is a design but did not have
secondary meaning). However, the Campbell Soup court did not examine any evidence for secon-
dary meaning and seemed committed to the idea that the mere color rule was the reason for denying
trademark rights. Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d at 799. This will go unanswered here. Colors in use
with other colors covering a product can obtain trademark status if they are sufficiently arbitrary,
while the mere division of the background into two colors will be handled under the mere color rule
and this Note.
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ange was likely to confuse consumers with respect to gold.187 However,
there is a "vast difference," which is not likely to cause confusion among
consumers, between bright yellow and gold.188 These two registration
decisions did not mention any difficulty in determining whether the col-
ors were likely to cause confusion.18 9 A red strand with a yellow strand
in a cable was not likely to be confused with a red strand in a cable since
informed consumers purchase cable.190
The Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board seems to have handled any problems with determining likelihood
of confusion between two colors to determine registrability. Since the
likelihood of confusion test is the same for infringement,1 91 the courts
should be able to determine the likelihood to confuse between two colors
as easily as for a word mark. Registration and infringement of color
alone should not be denied due to shade confusion.
3. Color Depletion
Color depletion may harm competition, but the harm is less likely to
occur than many courts assume and does not dictate that the mere color
rule be applied as an absolute bar. The color depletion theory is based on
the assumption that there is a limited number of colors.192 Granting
rights in one color will deplete the available number of colors.1 93 This
depletion will be anti-competitive. In Diamond Match v. Saginaw Match
Co.,' 94 the court denied rights to a color on a match head, stating that
"[t]he primary colors, even adding black and white, are but few. If two
of these colors can be appropriated for one brand of tipped matches, it
will not take long to appropriate the rest."' 95 Entrants into the market
will be unable to market a product when all the colors for covering the
goods are gone. t96 The mere color rule, based on a theory of color deple-
187. See Youngstown Sheet, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 656 (Both the orange and the gold colors
were used as a band placed on sewer pipes.).
188. Hodes-Lange, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 255.
189. Youngstown Sheet, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 656; Hodes-Lange, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 225.
However, the Youngstown test of hue combination (red and yellow makes orange or gold) is not
applied in Hodes-Lange. 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 256. Both decisions do not go into detail about the
colors or any particular evidence which showed a likelihood or not a likelihood to confuse.
190. Wire Rope Corp. v. Secalt S.A., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 312 (T.T.A.B. 1977). The court
pointed out that it is custom in the industry to use a color strand to identify source. Id. Given the
limited number of primary colors, the court felt a second comer to the industry should be allowed to
use secondary colors or color combinations to distinguish their products. Id.
191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1127, 1052 (1988).
192. See Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d at 798.
193. Id.
194. 142 F. 727 (6th Cir. 1906).
195. Id. at 729.
196. Id. at 730. The anti-competitive nature must be beyond the anti-competitive nature of giv-
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tion, has continued to be used to deny trademark rights in color alone.1 97
Owens-Corning addressed the color depletion theory by stating that
it "is not faulted for appropriate application," but the court found that it
did not apply to the facts of that case.198 Insulation is yellow-brown in
its natural state, and only Owens-Corning Fiberglas colors its product. 199
Thus, the court found that competition would not be hindered by giving
exclusive rights to the color pink.200 There was no "competitive need" 201
for the color pink in the home fiberglass insulation market. New compet-
itors could use yellow-brown like already-existent competitors. Existent
competitors did not create any demand for color since only Owens-Corn-
ing colored their fiberglass.
The availability of different colors must be examined to determine
the validity of the color depletion theory. Given the available number of
colors, the amount of the color spectrum taken up to avoid confusion
must be examined. The demand for color will also affect the applicability
of the color depletion theory and competitive need test. Finally, the pur-
poses of the trademark laws must be analyzed with respect to the deple-
tion theory.
"The primary colors, even adding black and white, are but a
few. ' 202 However, two colors must only be "likely to confuse consum-
ers,"' 203 so there will be more than just the primary colors for use on
products. Articles written on the Owens-Corning decision point out the
number of colors-362 categorized colors,2°4 7,500 distinct color
names,205 1,266 color samples. 20 6 These numbers all rest on the concept
ing out and limiting the number of words as marks, or numbers as marks, or color plus designs as
marks. Where do we draw the line? This is the nature of the dispute over the mere color rule.
197. Life Savers, 182 F.2d at 9 (this 1950 case applied the mere color rule in dicta since the
colors were determined to be functional); Norwich Pharmacal, 271 F.2d at 573 (this 1959 case ap-
plied the mere color rule in dicta, also, since the color pink was determined to be functional); Camp-
bell Soup, 175 F.2d at 798 (rights were denied based solely on the mere color rule in this 1949 case).
James Heddon's Sons v. Milisite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 169, 174 (E.D. Mich.), reh.
den., 51 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 84, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 674 (1940) ("There are only seven primary
colors. These colors have been used since man first noticed the rainbow."); Radio Corp. of Am. v.
Decca Records, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 493 (D.C.N.Y. 1943); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussy-
cat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 n.6 (2d Cir. 1979); Quabaug Rubber, 567 F.2d at 154; Deere &
Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
198. 774 F.2d at 1120. See Lupo, supra note 149, at 666-67.
199. Id. All the competitors sell fiberglas in its natural brown color.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 666. This is the Federal Circuit's test as a replacement of the mere color rule as an
absolute bar. The test is based on functionality.
202. Diamond Match, 142 F. at 729.
203. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
204. Henry, supra note 129, at 403 (citing the Munsell Color System).
205. Id. (citing the Inter-Society Council and National Bureau of Standards system).
206. Id. (citing KORNERUP & WANSCHER, COLOR ATLAS).
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of a color solid. 20 7 Any color can be represented by a combination of any
two of three primary colors (hue), varying value (lightness), and varying
chroma (saturation).208 Given these three dimensions of color, a three
dimensional solid of all the possible colors may be created. 2°9 However,
the number of colors in the solid is just a matter of the amount of space
each color is deemed to occupy. 210 The color solid can be divided into
anywhere from 13 to 5,000,000 colors.21 1 At 5,000,000 colors, machines
are needed to tell the difference between colors.212 The question is at
what number of colors will a consumer be able to distinguish two col-
ors.21 3 Therefore, merely listing the number of colors from these color
naming systems provides little insight.
Products and their colors may be examined by consumers side by
side or singly. 214 The range of colors taken up by products singly
presented will be larger, since a person's ability to remember a color is
less precise than a side by side analysis.215 In Nutrasweet, Equal was
described as a "greenish-blue" while Sweet One was described as a "red-
dish-blue." 216 A survey217 taken showed these two colors to cause
around 50% confusion.21 8 This suggests a broader range of colors which
will confuse, which limits the number of available colors for competitors
to use. The number of colors is clearly more than the traditional "few
primary" colors, but is not as large as has been suggested by some
commentators. 21 9
Other limitations may be relevant to the number of colors available
for a competitor to use. Only a certain number of colors are useable on
children's puzzles due to government toxicity standards. 220 The type of
product a color is applied to may limit the number of colors available.
207. KENNETH L. KELLY & DEUNE B. JUDD. COLOR, UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE AND DICTION-
ARY OF NAMES, A-6 (1976).
208. Id. at A-13.
209. Id. at A-6.
210. Id. at A-7.
211. Id.
212. Id. at A-17.
213. Burgunder, supra note 120, at 600 n.91.
214. American Home Products, 656 F. Supp. at 1099 (the court considered the worst case situa-
tion of the products being examined singly and independent of each other).
215. This Note will assume this worst case.
216. Brief for Appellee at 18, Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d 1024. The reddish-blue color analysis is only
considering hue, or color in one dimension, so the number of colors available is limited further than
if the other two dimensions were considered.
217. Evidence for Appellant, Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d 1024. This will be assumed to be valid,
although the Nurrasweet court never needed to determine the validity due to their application of the
mere color rule as an absolute bar.
218. Id.
219. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
220. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Colors used on light food products, such as milk, are limited to light
colors for consumer appeal. 221 Thus, certain products limit the number
of available non-confusing singly presented colors due to their nature.=
Food packages are one such item.2 3 Dark-colored packages tend to look
used, and people do not want to buy goods that look as if they have been
handled a lot.2 4 Pale colors suggest the package has been on a shelf too
long.225 Therefore, further limitations on the use of color in various, but
perhaps not all or many, markets affect the number of available colors for
competitive use.
Once the number of colors, based on the singly presented, unlikely-
to-be-confused ranges, is limited by market considerations, the demand
for colors must be studied to determine depletion. The number of com-
peting products in a market will act to place a burden on the number of
colors available for use. The greater the number of goods using different
colors, 226 the greater the depletion. In the sugar substitute industry,
there are many new entrants into a field with just as many established
competitors.227 Giving rights to the many competitors serves to lessen
the number of available colors. Therefore, an examination of the number
of competitors is needed. However, predicting the likelihood of future
competition, which makes use of distinguishing color, is "unwork-
able." 22s The more likely it is that a competitor is going to want to use a
non-natural color on a product, the more likely the demand in the mar-
ket will deplete the number of available colors. The purpose of not im-
peding competition may be harmed due to depletion from market
demand and competitor demand of the limited number of available
colors.229
Given the practical concern of color depletion, and only color deple-
tion, the mere color rule has some merit. With the policy of protecting a
manufacturer's investment as long as competition is not harmed, a form
of the competitive need test best satisfies the Lanham Act policy if it
accounts for color depletion.
221. Pacific Coast Condensed Milk Co. v. Frye & Co., 147 P. 865, 869 (Wash. 1915).
222. JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 4, at 32-33.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. This includes several lines of the same type of goods by one manufacturer, but with a differ-
ent color mark for each.
227. Nancy Ryan, End of Patent to Alter Market for Nutrasweet, Cm. TRIB., July 15, 1991,
Business, at 1.
228. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1028.
229. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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B. Owens-Coming and Subsequent Rule
The competitive need test satisfies the policy of protecting a manu-
facturer's investment and the countervailing policy of not harming com-
petition by taking into account the color depletion concerns. The Owens-
Corning court created an exception to the mere color rule based on
"competitive need" showing functionality.230 Owens-Coming Fiberglass
was the only manufacturer in the market which used a color other than
the natural yellow-brown of fiberglass. 23' Competitors chose not to
spend the money to dye their fiberglass, so granting rights in the color
pink would not harm competition in a market with no demand for col-
ors.232 The color depletion rationale did not apply to the fiberglass mar-
ket since there was no demand for color.233 The court determined there
was no competitive need.234
1. Cases Defining the Owens-Coming Competitive Need Test
Several courts have applied the Owens-Corning test for trademark
rights in color alone.235 These decisions provide an opportunity to ex-
amine the interpretation of the "competitive need" test developed by
Owens-Corning. Four approaches have developed and will be analyzed
for proper application later in this Note.
First, the Ninth Circuit applied the functionality test of competitive
need to the color yellow used on anti-freeze containers.2 36 The court first
noted that, "[c]onfronted with an unusual set of facts, the court in
Owens-Coming established a very limited rule that in certain situations a
particular color could itself be registered as a trademark. '237 The lower
court found a competitive need for yellow on anti-freeze containers based
on the fact that consumers respond favorably to yellow, 238 and that other
230. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. The dissent pointed out that this was based on the market at the present time and that
the market may change and new competitors enter. Id. at 1130. This Note will assume the Owens-
Corning majority was willing to take this limited risk that new competitors would not demand col-
ors. More or less risk may be appropriate and this concern will be examined later in the Note.
Future competitors are still able to enter the market by not coloring the product. There is no need to
color and no one can get rights in the non-colored product due to functionality. The risk is basically
non-existent.
235. American Hosp. Supply, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11000; Nor-Am Chemical Co. v. O.M.
Scott & Sons Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle, 719
F. Supp. 941 (D. Colo. 1988); First Brands, 809 F.2d 1378.
236. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1382.
237. Id. The First Brands court examined the Owens-Corning registration decision for a trade-
mark infringement suit to determine trademark rights in color.
238. This seems to indicate a finding of aesthetic functionality, so something more must be the
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anti-freeze sellers use a yellow color on their jugs. 2 3 9 The Ninth Circuit
relied on this finding to hold that there was a competitive need for yellow
in the anti-freeze market.24° The distinction for competitive need seems
to be the use of a particular color by other competitors (a middle ground
reading),241 or the use of any color, besides the natural color, by competi-
tors (the narrowest reading).242
Second, a court analyzing an infringement claim based on color
alone for blue fertilizer found competitive need, thus the court held that
the mere color rule applied.243 The court had previously determined that
fertilizer needed to be colored to show where the product had been ap-
plied.244 Through the need to color a product a color besides its natural
color, competitive need dictates that no one can have rights in any colors
in the relevant market.245 Fertilizer must be colored, so competitors
need to use non-natural colors, which will lead to a greater likelihood of
color depletion if color rights are granted.246
Third, another court examined functionality under a competitive
need for the background color of a phone book.247 The color red of a
phone book with strong secondary meaning only acted as a designation
of source and had no other function.248 "Protection of... the red cover
... does not hinder competition or remove a valuable qualitative feature
.... "249 This finding of no utilitarian function and no competitive need
is based on the fact that another color could just as easily be marketed. 250
Therefore, there was no competitive need when other colors were avail-
basis of competitive need. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text. Consumers probably
responded favorably to pink in home insulation, so the level of consumer response is most likely not
sufficient. This is especially so when compared to Deere & Co., where farmers attempted to have
their machinery match. 560 F. Supp. at 96. The court noted that sales would decreasejust because
there was no color match, which would not likely occur here.
239. Union Carbide Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (D. Or. 1985), aff'd sub
nom. Frst Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987).
240. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1383.
241. In Owens-Coming no other manufacturer used pink. 774 F.2d at 1122. In First Brands
other manufacturers used yellow on anti-freeze containers. 809 F.2d at 1382.
242. Owens-Corning was the only manufacturer of pink insulation to dye its product a color
different than the natural color. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
243. Nor-Am Chemical, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319 (blue also was functional due to the ge-
neric use of blue to represent a particular chemical present in the fertilizer).
244. Id.
245. Id. Competitive need is merely an expression of functionality, so the similarities with the
functionality doctrine are logical. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1120.
246. Id. at 1319 n.3.
247. Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle, 719 F. Supp. 941 (D. Colo. 1988).
248. Id. at 950.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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able and could be used with the same effectiveness. 251 However, this case
protected the combination of a red cover with white, yellow and black
writing.252
Fourth, in American Hospital Supply, 2 3 the court analyzed competi-
tive need for the color orange on bio-hazardous waste bags. 2 54 The
court, citing Owens-Coming, stated that the competitive need "require-
ment has been read to include 'whether alternative designs are available
to avoid hindering competition.' [citation omitted] The question here is
whether to compete in the... market, there are any alternatives to an all
orange bag."' 255 Even though others produced orange bags, a clear bag
was made and competed. 25 6 Based on the availability of alternatives,
there was no competitive need for the color orange.257
Thus, there are four approaches used to determine competitive need
under the functionality doctrine for color alone cases. First, if other
competitors use the same color, then there is competitive need.258  Sec-
ond, if other competitors use non-natural colors, then there is competi-
tive need for all colors.259 Third, if other competitors need to color (all
competitors color the product) the product a non-natural color, then
there is competitive need for all colors.26° Finally, if other competitors
do not have any other available color alternatives, then there is competi-
tive need.261
251. This is even broader than the possible competitive need base of First Brands and Owens-
Corning. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
252. 719 F. Supp. at 950. The court did not determine whether the color combination was an
arbitrary design operating as color plus design, or mere color. See supra notes 180-91 and accompa-
nying text. The combination of color features as a design could explain the broader holding of
competitive need by proof of other available alternatives which is a test of utilitarian functionality.
The case did cite the Owens-Corning color alone decision, and the color combination was possibly
not arbitrary. This would require a analysis under competitive need, since this would not be a color
design.
253. 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11000.
254. Id. at 35.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. The court stated "[t]he evidence points to the conclusion that the color orange is not
necessary, though helpful, to a competitive need." Id. This suggests an even broader sense of com-
petitive need requiring more than just helpful to compete. The color orange was found to be func-
tional other than under competitive need, so orange was not protected. Id.
258. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text. This test applies even if no competitor uses
the particular color claimed.
261. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text. This rule for competitive need encompasses
generic colors and those that have not acquired a consumer association but are meant to act
generically.
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C. The Best Approach Under the Competitive Need Test
Given the color depletion considerations above, combined with the
policy concerns-liberal protection of producer's investment in a trade-
mark and protection of consumers from deception-the best approach to
the competitive need test can be obtained. If a color operates to distin-
guish a product, the liberal purpose of protection of manufacturer invest-
ment dictates that rights be given.262 Competition should not be harmed,
so color depletion should be examined with respect to each approach.263
If the manufacturer's investment in a color alone mark may be protected
without impeding competition, trademark policy dictates that the color
alone should be protected as a trademark in an infringement suit or regis-
tration granted.264
There are five possible approaches for color alone: an absolute bar
to color alone,265 the use of any non-natural color by a competitor will
deny rights in color alone,266 the use of the same color by other competi-
tors will deny rights in color alone,267 a need for competitors to use a
non-natural color will deny rights in color alone,268 and rights will not be
denied in color alone as long as there is another alternative available.269
First, applying the mere color rule by not allowing any trademark
rights to develop in color alone is examined.270 This is contrary to the
purpose of protecting a manufacturer's investment in a mark. If all other
competitors used brown and rights were given to the sole competitor us-
ing pink, competition would not be harmed. 271 New competitors could
use brown and compete in the market as the others had been doing all
along. Thus, there is no and will not be any harm to competition as long
as no rights to brown, a base common color, are granted. There is a
manufacturer's investment to protect in pink, so applying the mere color
rule as an absolute bar is contrary to trademark purposes.
Second, allowing rights in color alone as long as there are alterna-
tives available is examined. If one company were allowed rights in the
color yellow, another in red, a third in green, and so on until only one
color went unappropriated, competition would be impaired. Every new
262. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
265. Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d 1024.
266. See supra note 257.
267. See supra note 254.
268. See supra note 258.
269. See supra note 259.
270. See Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d 1024.
271. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d 1116.
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competitor 272 would be forced to use the one last available color. In a
market where every past competitor was distinguished by color,273 hav-
ing several new entrants use the same color would lead to confusion by
consumers. This would increase search costs of consumers and deny a
return on investment since someone else's products of the same color
would be bought as that of the newcomers. Therefore, under the any
alternative color approach, competition is harmed from color depletion.
A base common color, a color used by multiple competitors which can-
not be trademarked, must exist.
Third, denying rights when others use the same color is examined.
If several manufacturers use red, then those manufacturers have an in-
vestment in their red product. Giving rights in red to one manufacturer
would harm competition by requiring a color change, at the least, by the
competitors. Rights in color alone to a color used by others should be
denied.
Fourth, requiring the use of non-natural color based on market rea-
sons as a reason to deny rights in color alone is examined. Since the
market involves colored goods, the chances of competitors using different
colors is greater. The likelihood that one base color for common use will
develop decreases, leading to the depletion of colors. Since this is anti-
competitive, if there is a market reason requiring the use of non-natural
color, rights in color alone should be denied, unless a base common color
exists.
Fifth, use of non-natural colors by competitors where the product
does not demand non-natural color as a reason to deny rights in color
alone is examined. Denying rights merely because a non-natural color is
used by others is contrary to the purposes of the trademark laws. If sev-
eral other competitors use one color, then competition is not harmed
when other colors are depleted. New competitors may make use of the
common color to compete until another color is generic.
Therefore, while the mere color rule should not be an absolute bar,
several relevant concerns dictate a finding of competitive need. The es-
tablishment of effective competition by multiple manufacturers using the
same color shows that no matter how many colors are depleted, competi-
tion will not be harmed. There must be a base common color. Consum-
ers will recognize that color is not the only means of distinguishing goods
in that market until a color becomes generic. It follows that no rights in
272. Given the difficulty of predicting new competition, new competition must be assumed to
occur in the future.
273. This would naturally preclude the availability of other distinguishing marks since the con-
sumer has been trained to look at only color to make a purchase.
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a common color may be given, or depletion may eventually impair com-
petition. As long as there is an effective base common color used by
several competitors and useable by new entrants, rights can be granted in
color alone without harming competition.
